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Abstract 
The Great Recession has sparked a debate amongst accounting professionals and 
economic analysts. There has been a concerted effort to blame fair value accounting and 
FAS 157 as the recession’s root cause and an attempt to challenge FASB to return to the 
historic cost principle. This paper examines the guidelines and procedures for mark to 
market as established by FASB, observes the events leading up to the recession, 
conditions that materialized at the start of the recession, evaluates the role fair value 
played in the financial crisis, and considers how fair value should be used in the future. 
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Fair Value Accounting 
 
How Bad Decisions Bring Blame to Beneficial Accounting Procedures 
The housing bubble, which had been growing in the 1990s and into the new 
millennium, began to burst in February 2007. It triggered what is now being considered 
the greatest recession in recent memory since the Great Depression. Banks had neither 
the necessary reserves to meet their personal obligations and the demands from their 
customers nor the liquidity in their investments to quickly convert them into cash to keep 
the recession from growing as quickly and as rapidly as it did (Ryan, 2008). Many 
different analysts have recently attacked the fair value option, enacted by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) through Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 157 
in September, 2006, claiming that the updated accounting rules for the assets and 
liabilities of banks was the cause of their illiquidity, and they proposed that continuing 
the use of the historic cost method would have prevented the current economic crisis 
from transpiring. Additionally, they have written journals and articles claiming that the 
FASB must depart from the required use of fair value accounting immediately to prevent 
another bubble similar to the housing bubble in late 2007. 
The predominant controversy amongst accounting professionals regarding the fair 
value option pertains to its apparent departure from the historic principle established 
within generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). A major objection of detractors 
is their belief that the switch to fair value accounting and the addition of the fair value 
option helped create the environment responsible for the 2007 recession. More 
specifically, the recession was magnified by the inability of banks to continue to loan 
capital to businesses, entrepreneurs, and individuals who needed the capital to expand the 
BAD DECISIONS BRING BLAME  5 
economy. The paramount issues which must be explored include what role fair value 
accounting played in the 2007 recession and the ensuing financial crisis. Additionally if 
fair value accounting was a major contributor to the recession an investigation must take 
place as to how it can be improved or eliminated to prevent a similar financial crisis from 
occurring in the future.  
The FASB has recently spent much time handling the issue of fair value 
accounting and has made changes to fair value guidance both immediately prior to and 
since the financial crisis. It is the intention of this paper to prove that although fair value 
accounting as established in SFAS 157 enhanced the severity and the swiftness of the 
financial crisis, the root cause of the financial crisis was the poor decision making of 
bank management by loosely handing out loans to unqualified lenders and their use of 
complex financial instruments to support the loans being made. Additionally, while the 
FASB recently has more comprehensively defined the rules for fair value accounting in 
the marketplace, the fair value accounting procedures for banks must further be made 
definitive to prevent false earnings within banks, to decrease volatility in the marketplace 
and the potential for market bubbles, and to give a more fair representation of the actual 
financial position of banks individually and in their relationship to one another. This will 
helps users of these financial statements to more clearly understand the financial position 
of banks and more readily alert customers, creditors, investors, and banks themselves of 
problematic financing before it is too late. 
A Review of Fair Value Accounting 
Fair Value Accounting Defined 
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Before looking further into this controversy, however, fair value must first be defined and 
explored as it is currently used in banks. The FASB defines fair value in ASC 820-10-35-
2 as “the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an 
orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date” (FASB 2012). 
This does not mean, however, that the fair value of an asset or liability is the current 
market value. Although it is possible for these two values to be in correspondence with 
one another, a clear and important distinction is that fair value refers to the value as of the 
measurement date, which could possibly be open to negotiation between a buyer and 
seller, whereas market value is a component of fair value, but not its basis. For example, 
the market could show the value of a stock to be at a certain level, but if an orderly 
transaction were to occur on that date, negotiations or other factors could cause the fair 
value to differ from the apparent market value on the measurement date. FASB 
determined that the measurement should be determined by assuming the transaction 
occurs in the principal market for the asset or liability, and when no principal market 
exists, valuation should be based upon a transaction in the most advantageous market for 
the asset or liability. Accordingly, the FASB outlines the proper rules and procedures 
determining the market and the actual fair value measurements and disclosures under 
section 820 of the FASB Accounting Standards Codification, which will subsequently be 
further explained. 
 Fair value accounting within the Codification is exceptionally far reaching, and is 
used for many different business transactions with varying, complex procedures. Because 
this paper relates primarily to banks’ use of fair value accounting, prior to, during, and 
since the recession, only these fair value procedures will be explored. The most common 
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use of fair value measurements are determining fair values for financial instruments, such 
as securities, bonds, or loans. Because the fair value option is exceptionally far reaching 
and complex, only fair valuation regarding these financial instruments will be explored 
and analyzed in depth within the Accounting Standards Codification. This analysis will 
then be used to explore fair value’s role in the financial crisis. 
Valuation Techniques 
 The Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) recognizes three different 
valuation techniques as acceptable approaches to measuring fair value: the market 
approach, income approach, and/or the cost approach. The ASC defines the market 
approach as “a valuation technique that uses prices and other relevant information 
generated by market transactions involving identical or comparable assets or liabilities” 
(FASB 2012). Therefore, the market approach focuses on using comparable assets and 
liabilities within the market to determine the value of the asset or liability being 
measured. It is necessary to use professional judgment to determine qualitative and 
quantitative comparable values under this approach. 
 FASB defines the income approach as “an approach that uses valuation 
techniques to convert future amount to a single present amount” (FASB 2012). Basically, 
the income approach uses time value of money techniques to determine present value of 
cash flows and earnings based on future expectations. The valuation techniques that the 
ASC allows for are present value techniques, option-pricing models, and the multi-period 
excess earnings method (used mainly for specific intangible assets). 
 Thirdly, FASB defines the cost approach “as a valuation technique based on the 
amount that currently would be required to replace the service capacity of an asset (often 
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referred to as current replacement cost)” (FASB 2012). This definition is the most easily 
understood, as it is simply the cost that a market participant would need to pay for an 
asset to replace that asset. Along with these three valuation techniques, the FASB created 
different inputs to be used based upon the availability of market data which are 
subsequently discussed. 
Level 1 Through 3 Inputs 
 When determining fair value, certain measurement techniques will be more 
accurate than others depending on how much information is readily available and 
determinable for a given financial instrument. Regarding the FASB’s codification 
techniques regarding fair value, Pounder notes, “The dominant fair value measurement 
approach under U.S. GAAP is based on a three-level hierarchy of methods” (Pounder 
2010). More specifically, there are three different Levels which may be used to determine 
fair value, Levels 1 through 3. The FASB desires that relevant and observable inputs are 
used for determining fair value measurements, which are used in Level 1 and Level 2. 
Level 3 inputs, as will be discussed, are based on unobservable inputs and rely more 
highly on estimates and valuation models and techniques. At times, an asset or liability 
may fall into different hierarchy levels, and the FASB decided that the entire fair value 
measurement should be decided based upon the lowest level in which any portion of the 
asset or liability exists (FASB 2012). 
Level 1 information is the most accurate representation of the current fair value of 
an asset or liability and is defined as “quoted prices (unadjusted) in active markets for 
identical assets or liabilities that the reporting entity has the ability to access at the 
measurement date” (FASB 2012). For example, Level 1 information for an actively 
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traded stock would be the market value of the stock on the measurement date (it must be 
actively traded to be a Level 1 input, as it would be an accurate representation of its 
current value). Because the stock market is generally instantaneously updated in today’s 
business environment, it is able to provide reliable and, equally important, objective 
information regarding fair value. Additionally, if any adjustment to the quoted market 
price is needed, the asset or liability fails to qualify as a Level 1 input and falls into the 
category of Level 2. 
 Level 2 information, located in the middle of the hierarchy, produces information 
less reliable than Level 1 information, but still remains more subjective than Level 3 
information. FASB (2012) defines Level 2 inputs as “inputs other than quoted prices 
included within Level 1 that are observable for the asset or liability, either directly or 
indirectly,” with specific examples seen in ASC 820-10-35-48. Whereas Level 1 inputs 
include assets and liabilities in active markets, Level 2 inputs measure assets and 
liabilities in inactive markets or slow-moving markets, but measurement is still 
observable. Adjustments are needed to the Level 1 input, but the adjustments are not 
severe enough to qualify it as a Level 3 input. To remain at Level 2, certain factors must 
be known including the condition or location of the asset being valued, the comparability 
of Level 1 assets and liabilities, and the volume of activity in the markets of the Level 2 
instruments. An example of Level 2 information would include transactions such as 
“receive-fixed, pay-variable interest rate swap based on a LIBOR swap rate,” or basing 
the price of a building held and used on the per square foot price of other buildings in the 
market in similar locations (FASB 820-10-55-21). These valuation methods would not be 
as accurate as current U.S. interest rates (as opposed to LIBOR), or the price the building 
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would actually sell for at the measurement date, but they are still able to provide reliable 
data regarding the asset or liability’s fair values. 
 Finally, Level 3 inputs are basically a last resort, back-up plan for fair value 
measurement because there is generally a large amount of subjective or unreliable 
information used in determining fair value (Pounder 2010). They are defined as 
“unobservable inputs for the asset or liability” (FASB 2012). An example of a Level 3 
input is a “[t]here-year option on exchange-traded shares. A Level 3 input would include 
historical volatility for the shares derived from the shares’ historical prices” (FASB 820-
10-55-22). This measurement thus provides unreliable information, as it is relying on 
historical changes in exchange rates which have no bearing on current or future exchange 
rates. Rather than using useful market information, Level 3 inputs rely heavily on 
valuation techniques and are much more susceptible to subjectivity. Therefore, Level 3 
inputs should only be used when there is absolutely no alternative, as they still provide a 
more reliable valuation than predictions or no information at all. However, these Level 3 
fair values pose significant complications to auditors who need assurance for the input, 
assumptions used, and limitations of the valuation techniques (Power, 2010). Level 3 
inputs depend heavily on pricing models by trying to incorporate risk into their valuation 
techniques, and because of the uncertainty and subjectivity involved in valuing Level 3 
inputs, the ASC offers extensive guidance on procedures for these inputs in paragraphs 
820-10-35-54 through 55. 
 A severe limitation of fair value measurement under current GAAP is the 
measurement of risk for fair values of assets and liabilities. While riskier financial 
instruments may be measurable based on the three-level hierarchy, the valuation attained 
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through the inputs may not provide a truly reliable representation of the fair value of the 
instruments (Kaplan, 2011). This is especially true of complex financial instruments, such 
as derivatives, which have recently stirred up controversy among accounting 
professionals regarding fair value even further and have actually served as a “crucial 
transformative catalyst” in accounting history as recent changes in GAAP are a direct 
result of valuing complex financial instruments (Power, 2010). These are the same types 
of instruments which will later be discussed as playing a role in the bursting bubble of the 
financial crisis. 
 One such Accounting Standards Update (ASU), titled “Improving Disclosures 
about Fair Value Measurements,” was designed to provide further disclosures in order to 
more fully explain the techniques used to obtain fair value measurements, disclosing 
which level (1, 2, or 3) inputs were used in determining fair value, and what the numbers 
actually mean. This update, ASU No. 2010-06 went into effect on January 21, 2010 for 
all reporting periods after December 15, 2009. ASU No. 2010-06 provides that auditors 
must disclose transfers between Levels 1 and 2 based on the information available at the 
measurement date and explain their reasoning behind the transfer. This lessens the 
uncertainty of both the risk and reliability of fair value measurements, and provides 
investors with a better understanding of the financial condition of the company. ASU No. 
2010-06 also forces accountants to disclose the assumptions they use under Level 3 
valuations and forces them to reconcile the beginning-of-period figures for Level 3 
measurements to the end-of-period figures so that users may see how assumptions and 
valuations have changed since the last reporting period. ASU No. 2010-06 also tried to 
force reports to include a sensitivity of assumptions for Level 3 measurements, where 
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accountants would include a best-case and worst-case scenario for assumptions, but this 
disclosure amendment still remains on the table for the FASB (Pounder, 2010). 
Introduction of SFAS 157 
 SFAS 157, “Fair Value Measurements,” is the accounting standard which 
introduced the procedures and the various inputs previously discussed. FASB’s 
overarching goal for this statement was to provide accurate values independent of 
companies’ management’s opinion for items on their balance sheet. FAS 157 was issued 
in September, 2006 (Trussel & Rose, 2009) and became effective for financial statements 
after November 15, 2007 even though earlier application to financial statements was 
encouraged (Zacharski, Rosenblat, Wagner, & Teufel,2007). The purpose of this standard 
was to define fair value, establish a measuring technique to measure fair value as an 
addition to GAAP, and to create new necessary disclosures for these techniques, which 
have already been explored. 
 FAS 157 was a bold and transformative issuance for FASB on several accounts. 
At the time of its institution, many accounting professionals were concerned about the 
effects of switching from the traditional accounting principle of historical cost by 
allowing assets and liabilities to be measured at their current fair market values. The 
historical cost principle stated that assets and liabilities should be reported at the price 
someone either paid for or received in the transaction, and remained unaccounted for 
until they were either sold or involved in another transaction. Today, critics believe this 
derivation to be a leading cause of the financial crisis. They argue that if the assets and 
liabilities held by banks during the housing bubble would have been valued at their 
historic cost, there would have been no liquidity crunch and thus, no collapse of the 
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financial system. Their criticism is not without merit. As Trussel and Rose (2009) point 
out that shortly after the issuance of FAS 157 was the time when many financial 
institutions began to unravel, making FAS 157 an obvious and easy accounting standard 
to blame. 
 Furthermore, critics have also voiced much opposition to the treatment of Level 3 
holdings. They argue that auditors are unable to make objective determinations of the 
value of these holdings. Consequently, since these holding must be calculated and 
recorded, critics argue these valuations leads to detrimental pressure on financial 
intuitions and the financial system as a whole. Rather than being classified as trading 
securities or available-for-sale securities, critics advocate that these Level 3 holdings 
should always be classified as held-to-maturity and thus be exempt from mark to market 
unless the fair value option is chosen by the company (Moore & Baker, 2010). These 
different types of securities will be discussed in the subsequent section. 
 While these criticisms hold merit, it will now be necessary to explore both 
previous statements by FASB regarding fair value measurements and then explore the 
actual market conditions during the time of the financial crisis before an adequate 
conclusion can be reached on the effects of FAS 157. This will provide background to the 
evolution of fair value theory, and ultimately justify the purpose and usefulness of fair 
value accounting within the context of FASB’s standards. The additional Financial 
Accounting Standards which will be explored are SFAS 115 “Accounting for Certain 
Investments in Debt and Equity Securities” and SFAS 159 “The Fair Value Option for 
Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities.” 
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Types of Securities 
 SFAS 115 established three categories of investments: trading securities, 
available- for-sale securities, and held-to-maturity securities. GAAP now has a working 
definition for each of these securities. Trading securities are securities which the buyer 
intends to sell within a short period of time; several days for instance. Available-for-sale 
securities are those securities that have determinable values, but are not classified as 
either trading or held-to-maturity securities. Held-to-maturity securities are those that the 
reporting entity plans to and has the ability to hold until they reach their maturity (ASC 
320-10-25-1). These different categories are important because they affect how different 
securities are treated with regard to fair value measurements. Entities report both trading 
securities and available-for-sale securities on their balance sheets at fair value. For 
trading securities, their unrealized gains and losses (since no transaction has actually 
taken place) are reported within net income. Available-for-sale securities, on the other 
hand, have their unrealized gains and losses reported as a component of other 
comprehensive income. Held-to-maturity securities are reported at their cost after any 
amortization and are adjusted for any more than temporary impairments (Krumwiede, 
Scadding, & Stevens, 2008). 
 However, SFAS 159, enacted in February, 2007, dramatically modified SFAS 
115. SFAS 159 allowed a provision for reporting entities by allowing them to make an 
election to classify a security normally classified as available-for-sale or held-to-maturity 
under SFAS 115 at their fair value, with unrealized gains and losses reported within net 
income rather than within other comprehensive income. The overarching goal of SFAS 
159, as cited by Krumwiede, Scadding, & Stevens (2008) is “to improve financial 
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reporting by providing entities with the opportunity to mitigate volatility in reported 
earnings caused by measuring related assets and liabilities differently without having to 
apply complex hedge accounting provisions.” In other words, FASB believes the fair 
value option gives financial statement users a more accurate representation of the current 
financial standing of a company, based on how management intends to use its 
investments. 
This election became effective for business’s fiscal year beginning after 
November 15, 2007. If an entity decides to adopt this standard, it is able to on a 
“contract-by-contract” basis determine which existing and all subsequent assets and 
liabilities will be reported on a fair value basis, with this election being irrevocable. In 
addition to this election, entities must disclose their reasoning when they have certain 
securities valued at fair value and others at historical cost if they are in a similar asset or 
liability class (Cataldo & McInnes, 2007). 
 Finally, there is an exception or closed loop hole within SFAS 159 to prevent 
entities from only using the fair value option when securities are increasing in value, and 
then switching them back when the securities are losing value, thus intentionally 
manipulating net income. For example, if an entity owns a security which had been 
elected for the fair value option and was increasing in value, but because of current 
market conditions the value of the security suddenly drops and is now underwater and the 
entity tries to replace it by purchasing a similar security without declaring the fair value 
option, SFAS 159 will not permit this, as it is not consistent with the Statement’s original 
intention. The disclosures required under SFAS 159 discourage these types of violations 
(Krumwiede, Scadding, & Stevens, 2008). 
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The Securitization Process 
What Is a Mortgage-backed Security (MBS)? 
 It is now possible to further explore the securities banks held on their financial 
statements during the financial crisis. Alles (2009) defines mortgage backed securities 
(MBS) as “debt instruments backed by mortgage pools, created by financial institutions 
through a securitization process.” This process is crucial for banks as it allows them to 
continue to issue mortgages to individuals and new loans to businesses as they transform 
their existing loans into cash which finances the new loan, and the cycle begins over 
again. The quality of the underlying mortgages in these securitized bonds determines the 
class of the newly constructed bond, and thus affects the interest rate, maturity date, risk 
level, and other factors associated with traditional debt instruments (Werkmeister, 2010). 
Therefore, these instruments are critical to banks for them to be able to maintain enough 
liquidity to continue their operations. An additional perk for banks using MBS is the 
transfer of risk from the bank to the entity purchasing the MBS. This is advantageous to 
the banking industry for two major reasons, one being that banks are no longer 
maintaining the risk of default, but passing that risk along and two being that through the 
transfer, the mortgages or loans are no longer carried on the bank’s balance sheet, freeing 
them from regulations, such as reserve requirements, and improving their financial ratios 
(Batchvarov, Hani, & Davies, 2002). 
 Any given MBS may contain 1,000 mortgages bundled together into various 
tranches (levels) and rated based on the quality of the mortgages. In the years precluding 
the financial crisis, these instruments were being securitized from subprime mortgages. 
Ryan (2008) explains that in the late 1970s through the early 1980s, banks referred to 
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“subprime” to describe commercial loans that failed to yield the prime rate because banks 
were confident that these borrowers would not default and gave them a slightly better 
than prime interest rate. However, the current use of the term “subprime” has almost an 
exact opposite meaning, as since 1995 banks have used the term to describe “less than 
highly creditworthy assets (e.g., subprime mortgages) that yield higher interest rates than 
do prime assets with similar non-credit risks” (Ryan 2008). These assets are generally 
considered less than creditworthy when borrowers have low credit ratings or are 
apparently buying too much house as a percentage of their disposable income. The 
following figure helps to picture how mortgages are separated into tranches within a 
given MBS. 
(Hull & White, 2010) 
 The portfolio, or the new debt instrument, is then rated based upon the tranches 
within. Hull & White (2010), in their study of MBS, examined that AAA tranches 
generally comprised 75-85 percent of the mortgage principle. However, banks decided to 
make these already complex financial instruments even further in complexity when they 
invented a new financial instrument called a collateralized debt obligation (CDO). 
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Collateralized Debt Obligations and Credit Default Swaps 
 Because of their complexity, especially in the years prior to the Great Recession, 
CDOs and credit default swaps (CDS) will only briefly be explored for the purpose of 
this paper. Because not all subprime mortgages were able to be packaged as what was 
considered AAA MBSs, many AA and lower-graded subprime MBSs were restructured 
and resecuritized as AAA collateralized debt obligations. Much like a MBS, CDOs are 
composed of senior-to-junior tranches, and through the securitization process, most of 
these CDOs were restructured so that their senior tranches were classified at a AAA 
rating even though their true underlying assets were risky MBSs (Ryan, 2008). Banks 
were able to justify an AAA rating because of the diversification levels of the mortgages 
within a given portfolio, ranging from geographic location to the type and income of the 
borrower. The AAA rating gave investors confidence that they were purchasing low risk 
investment, when in reality the CDOs were based on a pool of BBB mortgage backed 
securities (Thomas, 2010). 
 Additionally, Young, McCord, &Crawford (2010) define Credit Default Swaps 
(CDS) as “an insurance-type contract which promises to cover the buyer of the contract’s 
losses in the event of a default on the “insured” debt instrument.” In other words, a CDS 
is an insurance policy on different debt instruments, MBSs and CDOs included. 
Theoretically, CDSs are a useful tool for investors, as they have protection from the 
various debt investments they make. However, insurance companies thought they were 
insuring AAA CDOs, when in reality banks had hired different ratings agencies (such as 
S&P and Moody’s) to give the securities a AAA rating (Young, McCord, & Crawford, 
2010), and thus creating a conflict of interest for the ratings agencies.  
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These ratings agencies should have been accurately portraying the inherent risk to 
the securities, but were being paid by the banks creating the instruments, and as a result 
the ratings agencies wanted to keep the banks pleased leading to insurance companies 
cheaply insuring the instruments with CDSs. The following figure helps to visual the 
entire securitization and insurance process, from the originators (banks) to the investor, 
with guarantors (the insurance companies) supporting the process: 
Figure 2 
  (Ryan, 2008). 
The Great Recession 
The Bubble Bursts 
 There is now a sufficient amount of background to explore the causes of the Great 
Recession and to examine the role of Fair Value accounting to see whether or not it was a 
major contributor. Wheaton and Nechayev (2008) researched the housing bubble by 
studying the inflation in housing prices and other determinants of housing prices between 
1998 and 2005 to try and explain whether or not there actually was a housing bubble. 
Their study explains that housing prices within the United States rose only 18% from 
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1975 through 1988, marking a healthy and steady level of inflation, while incomes of 
Americans per capita rose approximately 40%. However, from 1998 through 2008, 
housing prices (as a whole; without factors such as geographic location taken into 
account) rose nearly 50% while incomes only grew between 5% and 11%. Additionally, 
Wheaton and Nechayev (2008) calculated that between 1965 and 1995, the 
homeownership rate ranged between 62% and 64%, but from 1995 through 2008 
homeownership escalated to 69%, and that over the last decade (that is, 1995-2005) the 
total number of renters in the United States has shrunk for the first time since World War 
II. 
 The question is then raised that if incomes were shrinking over the same time 
period that homeownership and housing prices were rising, how were Americans able to 
purchase these houses and obtain loans from banks? The simple answer is the previously 
discussed subprime mortgages which were bundled into MBSs. The following exhibit 
helps to visualize the availability of subprime lending in the years leading to the housing 
crisis. 
Figure 3: Subprime Mortgage Originations     
(Wheaton & Nechayev, 2008) 
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This level of subprime lending left the housing market in an extremely fragile condition. 
Cassidy (2008) as quoted by Moore and Baker (2010) offers an explanation for increased 
subprime loans by stating: 
In a move that could help increase home ownership rates among minorities and 
low-income consumers, the Fannie Mae Corporation is easing the credit 
requirements on loans that it will purchase from banks and other lenders. The 
action, which will begin as a pilot program involving 24 banks in 15 markets will 
encourage those banks to extend home mortgages to individuals whose credit is 
generally not good enough to qualify for conventional loans. In addition, banks, 
thrift institutions and mortgage companies have been pressing Fannie Mae to help 
them make more loans to so-called subprime borrowers. (p. 2)  
The role of the government through Fannie Mae and other agencies goes beyond the 
scope of this paper, but offers some background to the rapid utilization of subprime 
mortgages by banks. 
 Furthermore, Kohn and Bryant (2010)  describe the market in this way: “The 
prevailing attitudes of ‘bigger is better,’ or ‘as much as one can afford,’ or ‘buy now 
avoid future higher prices’ became the driving force for home buyers.” This mentality 
was based on the assumption that housing prices would continue to rise at the rate they 
had been over the past decade. Unfortunately but realistically, the bubble burst in a 
correction beginning in 2007, leading to a vastly increasing number of defaults reaching 
10% by the second quarter of 2009, and thus a dramatic decrease in housing prices (Mian 
& Sufi, 2010). As will be seen in the adjacent section, this housing crisis dried up the 
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liquidity of banks and propelled the economy into the Financial Crisis, leading to 
extremely high levels of unemployment.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Weakness of Household Balance Sheets 
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         Figure 5: Household Defaults and Unemployment 
 
     (Mian & Sufi, 2010). 
 
Lack of Liquidity Tied to Fair Value 
 GAAP requires holders of MBSs to report those MBSs at fair value. More 
specifically, ASC 948-310-35-3 states, “Fair value for uncommitted mortgage-backed 
securities that are collateralized by a mortgage banking entity's own loans ordinarily shall 
be based on the fair value of the securities. If the trust holding the loans may be readily 
terminated and the loans sold directly, fair value for the securities shall be based on the 
fair value of the loans or the securities, depending on the mortgage banking entity's sales 
intent. Fair value for other uncommitted mortgage-backed securities shall be based on 
published mortgage-backed securities yields” (FASB 2012). Generally, when banks were 
securitizing mortgage-backed securities, they had the intention of selling them to generate 
extra liquidity to support future mortgages, thus qualifying them for fair value reporting. 
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 The bursting housing bubble created a serious predicament for the banking 
industry. As many subprime borrowers began to default all at once, the value of MBSs 
began to decline dramatically, leaving most completely worthless. What investors saw as 
a risk-free asset because of its AAA rating had imploded, and from January through 
March, 2008, major insurers of these instruments reported huge losses on mortgage-
backed securities, collateralized debt obligations, and the credit default swaps insurance 
policies (Ryan 2008). Because of FAS 157, banks and holders of these securities were 
required to record them at fair value. 
 The fair value of a MBS became an extremely difficult process. Before the 
housing crisis, most MBSs were considered Level 2 inputs as they were not actively 
traded, but there was a rapidly growing market for these securities. Therefore, there was 
still a substantial amount of information in the market for financial statement preparers to 
find quoted bid and ask prices. However, after the housing crisis the market for 
mortgage-backed securities evaporated, leaving the securities with little to no price 
transparency (Ryan 2008). Because of the unavailability of an active market, the value of 
a given MBS converted from a Level 2 measurement to the much more subjective Level 
3 measurement. ASC 820-10-35-26 states that a change in valuation technique must be 
accounted for as a change in accounting estimate, and as a result, is subject to further 
disclosure on financial statements (FASB 2012). 
 McMahon (2011) describes the effect of the written down mortgage-backed 
securities on the leverage ratios of banks. When housing prices were growing, it allowed 
banks to further leverage themselves because of the gains they were making on the risky 
loan assets. However, when the market took a downturn, the previous balance sheet 
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equity evaporated because of fair value reporting. McMahon (2011) further evaluates that 
if a bank is leveraged at 10 times, if the overall assets of that bank drop 9%, which was 
no stretch of the imagination for the Financial Crisis, then it would cause leverage to 
apparently leap to 91. It is because this was happening at every bank, that not only could 
they no longer create new loans because of their excessive leverage ratios, but they also 
were forced to deleverage their balance sheets to the regulated levels, as impossible as it 
seemed with their enormous leverage ratios. This had a ripple effect into the economy as 
a whole, as businesses and individuals could not obtain financing to maintain a stable 
economic system. 
Fair Value or Poor Decision Making? 
 After evaluating the preponderance of evidence of the economic condition of the 
United States, especially within the banking industry at the start of the financial crisis, it 
is conclusive that SFAS 157 and fair value accounting was not the sole or even major 
contributor of the financial crisis. Seay and Ford (2010) explained the ethical dilemma in 
fair value accounting: “Politicians, lobbyists, and media representatives may not 
understand the operation of the capital markets and accounting’s key role in resource 
allocation decisions within those markets.” In other words, much of the criticism of the 
accounting practices throughout the recent meltdown has come from sources who do not 
fully comprehend the role of the accountant in the capital market. 
 Accounting during financial crises should be no different than when markets are 
running efficiently, and was no different during the Great Recession than at any other 
point in the profession’s history. The SEC declared that fair value increased the quality 
and the reliability of financial statements for investors (Seay & Ford, 2010), and although 
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it was extremely painful, fair value ultimately revealed the current and future risk which 
banks were carrying on their books and hiding in securitizations. The level of subprime 
loans banks were lending, the risk levels associated with the insurance of these loans, and 
the inaccurate ratings of the securitized bonds were all major contributors and direct 
causes of the crisis. Rather than criticize fair value accounting for causing the recession, 
mark to market should be applauded for revealing the true economic condition of the 
country leading to a market correction as painful as it felt for the greater economy. 
The Future of Fair Value Accounting 
Recent FV News 
 Recently, fair value has made substantial headway in news outlets as it has been a 
popular element at the forefront of current accounting issues. Even after the financial 
crisis, banks’ use of fair value accounting has been frowned upon which has only further 
ignited the debate amongst accounting professionals. An article from the Wall Street 
Journal (WSJ) reported that J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., for example, made a “debt 
valuation adjustment” which increased their 2011 third-quarter earnings by $1.9 billion. 
This gain arose from a decline in the market value of J.P. Morgan’s debt, mainly “certain 
structured and derivative liabilities” (much like, if not the same structured liabilities 
discussed earlier in the paper), and thus reported huge earnings with no operations tied to 
the earnings. In an interview for the article, accounting and tax expert Willens said, “I 
think this is the kind of thing that gives accountants a bad name, frankly” (Rapoport & 
Lucchetti, 2011). 
 In this same quarter, Bank of America likewise reported $6.2 billion in gains 
corresponding from a drop in the value of their debt. These fluctuations in earnings have 
BAD DECISIONS BRING BLAME  27 
confused certain investors, especially unknowledgeable ones, regarding comparisons 
between the actual financial conditions of the major banks. (The major banks include 
Bank of America, Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley Wells Fargo & Co., and 
Goldman Sachs). However, most of these fluctuations are not a result of fair value 
accounting in and of itself but rather largely because these big banks are constantly 
attempting to use the rules of fair value accounting to gain short-term advantages over 
their competitors (Reilly, 2011). 
 Possibly the most blatant example of attempting to tamper with short-term gains 
was reported by the WSJ in the article “Will Goldman Mark Down It’s Principle?” Reilly 
(2011) proclaimed:  “It’s fine to have principles on Wall Street, just so long as they don’t 
get in the way of short-term gains.” He then explains that Goldman and Morgan Stanley 
were considering and actually attempted to reclassify certain investments to historical 
cost to keep pace with the gigantic gains J.P. Morgan reported. Rather than being 
concerned with financial reporting to fairly represent their company’s financial position 
to investors and creditors, it appears that banks are more concerned with using accounting 
procedures to create a façade on their income sheets and balance sheets to falsely 
persuade the market they are in a better position than they actually are. Banks should be 
more concerned with evaluating risk of their underlying investments and debt issues and 
should attempt to clearly and fairly communicate these levels through their value on 
financial statements and disclosures about their actual nature. 
 Finally, the Federal Reserve will be creating new regulations to limit the 
interconnectedness of these major banking institutions. The net credit exposure which 
will be allowed between any two of the six largest institutions cannot exceed 10% of the 
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company’s regulatory capital, as compared to the 25% allowed for most other firms under 
the Dodd-Frank bill (McGrane & Fitzpatrick, 2011). The Fed believes limiting the credit 
exposure amongst these institutions will prevent the severity experienced during the 
Great Recession from recurring in the future and will cause these banks to return to a 
more traditional banking model of making traditional loans to individuals and businesses 
as opposed to the recent risky investments and securitizations observed in banks. 
Although this may decrease the profitability of the financial institutions, the Fed believes 
this regulation will hopefully eliminate paper gains and benefit society by preventing a 
similar financial meltdown. 
Fair Value Is Here To Stay 
 Regardless of the opposition to fair value accounting, it appears that FASB will 
not curtail its procedures for mark-to-market. Therefore, accountants must learn to 
become content with the current procedures and enhance their expertise in valuation 
techniques. Power (2011) argues, “So the intellectualization of financial reporting in the 
shadow of financial economics is not simply an issue of technical measurement – it is a 
blueprint for redesigning the knowledge base of an entire profession.” Therefore, it is 
apparent that fair valuation has become a blueprint for future accounting practices and 
will only continue to expand, not only within GAAP, but also in convergence with the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) in international standards. 
 Likewise, auditors will be challenged in the future with determining the reliability 
of financial statements when fair value measurements are involved, especially when 
Level 3 inputs are involved. Foster and Shastri (2010) acknowledge that auditors must be 
extremely aware of deceptive practices in these valuations as corporate managers are able 
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to manipulate their valuation techniques to deceive their creditors and investors, as was 
seen with the major collapses of Bear Stearns and Lehman brothers during the financial 
crisis. Therefore, the future will be a challenging time for auditors and users of financial 
statements, especially in the area of fraud, as illiquid markets offer enough uncertainty 
for companies to skew their financial information (Foster & Shastri, 2010). It will be 
interesting to see the new techniques auditors begin to employ as fair valuation expands 
in financial practice. 
 Pannese and DelFavero (2010) believe the recent implications of FASB will 
eventually lead to the historical cost principle no longer being taught in academia over 
the next several decades. They argue that the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) should make a concerted effort to replace education of historic cost with 
innovative valuation techniques. They also fear that current accounting students will not 
be fully prepared to meet the current challenges in the transition from historic cost to FV, 
as their education is taking place at the precipice of this transition. As FV continues to 
develop, it will be crucial for the PCAOB and auditors to continue to adapt to the new 
issues by FASB in addition to its convergence project with the IASB. 
Conclusion 
Accounting professionals must dismiss their fears of fair value accounting. It is 
healthy for the profession to continue to criticize these procedures to ensure the greatest 
reliability for users of financial statements, but to revert back to historic cost would be a 
major regression for GAAP. It should now be apparent that while fair value accounting 
may have increased the severity of the financial crisis or prematurely began it, this 
technique surfaced the hidden, unwise, and deceptive decisions banks and other financial 
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institutions were making. It is certainly possible that without the issuance of SFAS 157 in 
2006, the historic cost method would have continued to allow the bubble to expand, and 
eventually burst into a much deeper recession than the one currently being witnessed.  
As an excellent summation for mark to market’s true role in the financial crisis, 
Hughes (2008), in an interview in a Financial Times article reported, “Accounting 
doesn’t create reality, it reflects it. Here it has clarified where there are some issues and 
has illuminated them. In the criticism there is an element of ‘we don’t like the answer. If 
you use market valuations, that by nature creates volatility because markets are volatile. 
But accounting is only reflecting that volatility.” Fair value did not create the reality seen 
in the Great Recession, it merely reflected the corrosive business practices which were 
slowly destroying the economy. 
Many professionals and market observant will continue in their attempt to repeal 
SFAS 157 and all related mark to market practices, but their efforts will be much more 
fruitful spent on improving the current system. Fair value accounting will ultimately hold 
decision makers to a higher standard in the daily operations of their company and will 
prevent financial institutions and their executives from making risky bets to turn a quick 
profit. Rather, knowing that fair value accounting is the future of reporting will cause 
executives to make sound business decisions or otherwise have their financial statements 
disclose the true nature of their decisions. 
This is a historic period for the accounting profession, and the future of the 
accounting profession will remember FAS 157 for its progressive and transformational 
effect on financial reporting. Accounting has and will always be focused on improving 
the reliability of financial statements, and fair value accounting will only continue to help 
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users understand the current financial condition of the businesses with whom they 
interact. 
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